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INTOXICATING LIQUORS-PERSONS LIABLE:
NORTH DAKOTA EXTENDS STATUTORY DRAM SHOP
LIABILITY TO SOCIAL HOSTS
Born v. Mayers, 514 N.W.2d 687 (N.D. 1994)
I. FACTS
Kevin Born, with his wife Jody Born, owned and operated the
Rogers Bar & Cafe in Rogers, North Dakota.1 Dan Mayers was the
manager of the Wheat-Land Elevator Corp [hereinafter Wheat-Land].2
In the early morning hours of August 31, 1990, following the closing of
the Rogers Bar, Mr. Born along with Mayers, Todd Fuglestad, and Kim
and Neil Amann, went to Mayers' house. 3 The group brought along a
case of beer from the Rogers Bar which was charged to the Wheat-Land
account. 4 The group had been at Mayers' house sitting around the
kitchen table talking for about one hour, when Fuglestad struck Mr.
Born in the face with the back of his hand.5 Fuglestad's actions were
allegedly in response to Mr. Born's questioning of Fuglestad, in front of
the group, about an outstanding tab at the Rogers Bar.6 The blow
knocked Mr. Born off of his chair and onto the floor.7 Fuglestad got up
and attempted to hit Mr. Born again; however, Kim Amann intervened,
causing the second swing to only graze Mr. Born. 8 Following the
altercation, the parties left Mayers' house. 9 Mr. Born's only visible
injury at that time was a cut lip.10 The next day, however, Mr. Born
1. Born v. Mayers. 514 N.W.2d 687,688 (N.D. 1994).
2. Id. Mayers had submitted his resignation to Wheat-Land, but his resignation had not yet taken
effect on the date of the incident. Order of Certification to the Supreme Court of North Dakota at 2-3,
Born v. Mayers, 514 N.W.2d 687 (N.D. 1994), Rodney S. Webb, Ci.. United States District Court,
October 7, 1993 [hereinafter Order of Certification].
3. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 688. Wheat-Land provided the house to Mayers as part of his
employment compensation. Id. Furthermore, Wheat-Land authorized Mayers to use the house to
promote the good-will of the company by entertaining people in the community. Id.
4. Id. Each member of the group that went to Mayers' house, save Born who was bartending,
had consumed several drinks while at the Rogers Bar. Order of Certification, supra note 2. at 3-4.
Mayers purchased several drinks for patrons while at the Rogers Bar that evening and drank a total of
four or five beers himself while at the Rogers Bar. Id. Fuglestad consumed at least ten drinks while at
the Rogers Bar, one of which was purchased by Mayers on the Wheat-Land account. Id.
5. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 688. Each member of the group at Mayers' house that evening
consumed about one-half of a can of beer from the case of beer that was brought from the Rogers Bar
except for Fuglestad who consumed one full beer. See Order of Certification, supra note 2, at 4.
6. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 688.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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suffered a stroke leaving him with minimal physical and mental capabili-
ties.11
Initiating a diversity action in federal district court, Mrs. Born
alleged that Mayers had violated section 05-01-06.1 of the North Dakota
Century Code by furnishing alcohol to Fuglestad who was "obviously
intoxicated" and who later, while intoxicated, caused Mr. Born's in-
jury.12 Mrs. Born further claimed that Wheat-Land was vicariously
responsible for Mayers' actions. 13 Mayers and Wheat-Land made a
motion for summary judgment14 and for judgment on the pleadings, 15
claiming that section 05-01-06.1 of the North Dakota Century Code
only creates claims against persons engaged in the business of selling or
distributing alcohol and therefore would not apply to social hosts.16 The
district court sent a certified question to the North Dakota Supreme
Court on the issue of dram shop liability of persons not engaged in the
business of selling or distributing alcohol. 17  The North Dakota Su-
preme Court answered both certified questions by holding that section
05-01-06.1 of the North Dakota Century Code is applicable to persons
not engaged in the business of selling or distributing alcohol.18
This Comment will review the history of social host liability under
several different theories, focusing on the extension of dram shop acts to
include liability for social hosts. This Comment will then examine the
logic behind the North Dakota Supreme Court's adoption of social host
liability under the North Dakota Dram Shop Act in Born v. Mayers.19
11. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 688-89. Born's stroke was caused by a severed carotid artery wall in
his neck. Id.
12. Id. at 689; see infra note 50 (providing the text of N.D. CENT. CODE § 05-01-06.1 (1987)).
13. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 689. Wheat-Land owned the house, paid for the drinks, and Mayers'
job description called for him to entertain people in the community to promote good-will on the
company's behalf. Id.
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
16. Order of Certification, supra note 2, at 5-6. N. D. CENT. CODE § 05-01-06.1 (1987).
17. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 688; ND. R. APP. PROC. 47. The district court's Certified Questions
read as follows:
I. Does the North Dakota Dram Shop Act, section 5-01-06.1 of the North Dakota
Century Code, create a right of action against a party not engaged in the business of
selling intoxicating liquor, who gives another an intoxicating liquor as an act of hospitality
or social courtesy?
II. Does the North Dakota Dram Shop Act, section 5-01-06.1 of the North Dakota
Century Code, create a right of action against a party not engaged in the business of
selling intoxicating liquor, who gives another an intoxicating liquor without direct
pecuniary gain, but nevertheless in an attempt to promote business good will?
Born, 514 N.W.2d at 688.
18. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 688. N.D. CENT CODE § 05-01-06.1 (1987). The parties reached a
settlement before they were to re-appear in U.S. District Court. Settlement Reached in Bar Lawsuit,
FAROO FORUM, Sept. 7, 1994, at C1.
19. 514 N.W.2d 687 (N.D. 1994).
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Finally, this Comment will discuss Born's potential impact on North
Dakota law in light of the court's more recent interpretation of the North
Dakota Dram Shop Act in Stewart v. Ryan.20
II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY
Alcohol use at social gatherings is a well-established fixture in our
society. However, excessive use of alcohol is a significant problem,
especially when persons who have had too much to drink get behind the
wheel of an automobile. 21 Intoxicated drivers are the logical targets for
recovery by persons injured in alcohol-related accidents. 22 However, the
intoxicated drivers are often uninsured or insolvent; therefore, recovery
is frequently sought against the party that provided the intoxicated
person with alcohol. 23
Traditionally, under common law, alcohol providers were not held
liable for injuries sustained by persons to whom the providers served, or
by third parties injured by persons the providers served. 24 The theory
behind the common law position was that consumption of alcohol by an
able bodied person, rather than the provision of it, was the proximate
cause of the injury.25 However, the traditional common law immunity of
alcohol providers has steadily eroded since the mid-1800's, with states
imposing civil liability on alcohol providers. 26
Traditionally, states have only imposed civil liability on commercial
vendors for wrongfully serving alcohol. 27 In recent years, however,
20. 520 N.W.2d 39 (N.D. 1994).
21. N.D. Dept. of Transp. (1993). As of 1993, alcohol related accidents compromised
approximately 40% of the total number of fatalities on North Dakota highways. Id. Although the total
number of accidents has been decreasing over the last 5 years, the percentage attributable to alcohol
has remained constant. Id.
22. See generally Timothy R. Duncan, Comment, Noncommercial Liquor Vendor Liability: Social
Host and Employer-Host Liability in Minnesota: Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985);
Meany v. Newell, 367 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1985), 9 HAMLINE L. REV. 223 (1986) [hereinafter
Noncommercial Liquor Vendor Liability] (discussing the Minnesota experience with social host
liability).
23. Id. at 223-24.
24. Stewart v. Ryan, 520 N.W.2d 39, 47 (N.D. 1994) (citing Hyba v. C.A. Horneman, Inc., 23
N.E.2d 564 (I11. App. Ct. 1939)).
25. Id. at 47 (citing 45 AM. Jui. 2D, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 553-54 (1969)).
26. Jon R. Erickson & Donna H. Hamilton, Comment, Liability of Commercial Vendors,
Employers, and Social Hosts for Torts of the Intoxicated, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1013, 1015 (1983)
[hereinafter Liability of Commercial Vendors]; Mary M. French et al., Special Project, Social Host
Liability for the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1058, 1065 (1983)
[hereinafter Social Host Liability].
27. Noncommercial Liquor Vendor Liability, supra note 22, at 223. Alcohol providers fall into
two categories: 1) commercial vendors of alcohol, and 2) social hosts. Id. Generally, a commercial
provider of alcohol is a business entity that provides alcohol under the auspices of a permit or license
to sell or distribute alcohol, such as a liquor store or a bar. Id. at 223 n.2. Persons who provide alcohol
7451995]
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growing concern over the problems of drinking and driving has prompt-
ed courts in many states to hold social hosts liable for injuries sustained
as a result of the provision of alcohol to an intoxicated guest or a mi-
nor.
28
Historically, states have extended civil liability to social hosts in one
of four ways. 29 First, some states have extended their dram shop acts, 30
which traditionally held commercial vendors of alcohol civilly liable
under certain circumstances, to include liability for social hosts.3 1
Second, some states have held alcohol providers, including social hosts,
who violate a criminal beverage control statute civilly liable by finding
in a noncommercial setting without a license or permit are generally referred to as "social hosts." Id.;
Kim Ronald Smith, Recent Decision, 66 TEMp. L. REV. 629,632 n.35 (1993).
28. Noncommercial Liquor Vendor Liability, supra note 22, at 223; McGuiggan v. New England
Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141, 145-46 (Mass. 1986) (noting that "[t]he trend toward imposing
liability [on social hosts] is no doubt a response to the greater concern of society in recent years
regarding the problems of drunken driving").
29. Social Host Liability, supra note 26, at 1063 (discussing the three most common ways of
imposing social host liability); see also NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.6 (West Supp. 1995) (creating an
exclusive civil remedy for third parties injured as a result of the negligent provision of alcohol to a
guest who was driving a vehicle).
30. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 494 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a "dram shop" as "[a] drinking
establishment where liquors are sold to be drunk on the premises; a bar or saloon"). A "dram" is
defined as "[a] drink of some substance containing alcohol; something which can produce
intoxication." Id. "Dram shop acts" are "[a]cts which impose liability on the seller of intoxicating
liquors ... when a third party is injured as a result of the intoxication of the buyer where the sale has
caused or contributed to such intoxication." Id.
Statutes commonly called "dram shop" or "civil damages" acts will be referred to as "dram
shop" acts within this Comment.
31. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text (discussing the imposition of social host liability
under dram shop acts).
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that such a violation indicates that the alcohol provider was negligent or
negligent per se.32 Third, some states have rejected the traditional
common law immunity for alcohol providers and hold the alcohol
provider liable based upon common law negligence principles. 33
Finally, at least one state has enacted a statute which solely addresses
social host liability.3 4 This Comment will focus on the extension of
dram shop acts to include social host liability since the North Dakota
32. All 50 states and the District of Columbia have beverage control acts which generally regard
a sale or gift of alcohol to a minor or a visibly intoxicated person as a criminal misdemeanor. See
Social Host Liability, supra note 26, at 1076 n.135 (listing the statutes of each jurisdiction);
Noncommercial Liquor Vendor Liability, supra note 22, at 237 n.108. A typical beverage control act is
section 05-01-09 of the North Dakota Century Code, which states; "[a]ny person knowingly delivering
alcoholic beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age, except as allowed under section 5-02-
06, or to a habitual drunkard, an incompetent, or an obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor." N.D. CENT. CODE § 05-01-09 (Supp. 1995). Many courts have construed the beverage
control acts to create a statutory standard of care and hold providers of alcohol, including social hosts,
civilly liable when a statutory violation is found. Carla Kaluzniak Smith, Note, Social Host Liability for
Injuries Caused by the Acts of an Intoxicated Guest, 59 N.D. L. REV. 445,459 (1983); Noncommercial
Liquor Vendor Liability, supra note 22, at 238-39.
Courts have found that a violation of a beverage control act constitutes either: 1) negligence per
se, or 2) merely evidence of negligence on the part of the alcohol provider. Compare Rappaport v.
Nichols, 156 A.2d 1, 9 (1959) (finding a beverage control act violation was evidence of negligence)
with Cravens v. Inman, 586 N.E.2d 367, 378-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding that a beverage control
act violation could be negligence per se).
Currently, several states impose civil liability upon social hosts under beverage control statutes;
however, the trend is to recognize it only when service of alcohol to a minor is the source of the
statutory violation. Noncommercial Liquor Vendor Liability, supra note 22, at 247-48; Compare
Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515. 518 (Pa. 1983) (recognizing social host liability based
on a beverage control act violation for serving alcohol to a minor) with Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d
507, 510-11 (Pa. 1983) (refusing to recognize social host liability based on a beverage control act
violation for service of alcohol to an intoxicated adult).
33. The jurisdictions utilizing this theory have abrogated the traditional common law immunity of
alcohol providers in favor of a general duty on the part of alcohol providers to refrain from serving
alcohol to persons if an injury is a foreseeable result. Liability of Commercial Vendors, supra note 26,
at 1021-22. The elements of an action against alcohol providers under common law negligence
principles are satisfied by showing: 1) alcohol was supplied to a minor or intoxicated person, 2) with
knowledge that they may drive, 3) when a reasonable person under similar circumstances would not
have supplied the alcohol, and 4) the service of the alcohol was the proximate cause of the injuries.
Id.
A claim under common law negligence principles differs from a claim based on beverage
control acts because the standard to which an alcohol provider is held is statutorily defined in the
latter. Social Host Liability, supra note 26, at 1085-86.
A majority of jurisdictions now recognize an action against commercial providers of alcohol
under common law negligence principles. Allocation of Fault, infra note 37, at 274-76 n.43 (listing the
jurisdictions which have abrogated the traditional common law position for liability based on common
law negligence). Several jurisdictions have further extended civil liability to social hosts under
common law negligence principles. See, e.g., Weiner v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega
Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18, 23 (Or. 1971) (finding social host civilly liable under common law negligence
principles for serving a minor); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (NJ. 1984) (finding a social
host civilly liable under common law negligence principles for wrongfully serving an adult).
However, like beverage control acts, actions under common law negligence principles are generally
limited to cases where minors are served. Cravens v. Inman, 586 N.E.2d 367, 374-75 (Il. Ct. App.
1991).
34. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.6 (West Supp. 1995).
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Supreme Court in Born v. Mayers was faced with the issue of whether
social hosts are liable under the North Dakota Dram Shop Act.
In the mid-1800's, many states enacted dram shop statutes in
response to public outcry for limitations on the availability and use of
alcohol.35 Dram shop acts generally impose strict liability on the alcohol
provider when the provision of alcohol results in an injury to a third
person because of the intoxication of the buyer. 36 Currently, most states
have adopted some form of dram shop statute.37
Dram shop statutes can be classified into two categories based upon
the language of the statute. 38 The broad construction of some dram
shop statutes make them appear to hold liable anyone, including a social
35. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (noting the increased number of laws limiting
the availability of alcohol). Wisconsin is often credited as enacting the first dram shop act in 1850,
imposing civil liability for damages due to the sale of intoxicating liquors. Act of February 8, 1850, ch.
139 § 1. 1850 Wis. LAWS 109. The Wisconsin alcohol vendors were required to post a bond to support
the children and widows of those injured as a result of the vendor's traffic in alcoholic beverages. Id.
For a more detailed analysis of the historical development of alcohol vendor liability under dram shop
acts, see Social Host Liability, supra note 26, at 1065 (discussing in detail the historical development of
dram shop legislation).
36. See generally W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 81 (5th
ed. 1984). Generally, the elements of a dram shop act are: 1) the involvement of alcohol, 2) the
vendor or social host transferred the alcohol, 3) the minor, intoxicated person, or habitual drunkard
consumed the alcohol, 4) the drink contributed to the intoxication of the individual, 5) the minor,
intoxicated individual, or habitual drunkard injured the claimant, 6) the intoxication of the individual
caused the injury, and 7) the provision of alcohol was against the law. Cf. Darcie S. Yoshinaga,
Casenote, 14 U. HAw. L. REV. 829 (1992) (discussing the Hawaii Supreme Court's refusal to
recognize social host liability).
37. Smith v. Sewell, 858 S.W.2d 350, 352 n.2 (Tex. 1993) (listing the jurisdictions which have
enacted dram shop acts); Pamela A. Moore, Student Comment, Lee v. Kiku Restaurant: Allocation of
Fault Between an Alcohol Vendor and a Patron- What Could Happen After Providing "One More for
the Road", 17 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 269,271 (1993) [hereinafter Allocation of Fault].
It appears that 36 jurisdictions presently have enacted some version of a dram shop statute.
ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-70 to -71 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 04.21.020, .16.030 (1994); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 4-301 to -302, 4-311 to -312 (1995); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 25602, 25602.1 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-46-112.5. -47-128.5 (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-21-103 (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.125
(West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-1-18, -40 (Michie Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 23-808 (Supp.1994);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, para. 135 (Smith-Hurd 1986 & Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 7.1-5-7-8(b),
7.1-5-10-15.5 (Burns 1991); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 123.49, .92 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 413.241 (Baldwin 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.1 (West 1991); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28-A, §§ 2501-2520 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994-95); MIcH. Comp'. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (West
Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.801 (West 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. § 67-3-73 (1972); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 537.053 (Vernon 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-710 (1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 507-
F:I to :8 (Supp. 1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:22A-I to -7 (West 1987); N.M. S TAT. ANN. § 41-11-1
(Michie 1978); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 1-101 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-120 to -
129 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06.1 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4399.01, .18 (Baldwin
Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.950-960 (1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 4-493, -497 (Supp.
1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 3-14-1 to -15 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 57-10-101 to -102 (1989); 'Ex.
ALCO. BE. CODE ANN. §§ 2.01-.03 (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-14-101 (1994); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 125.035 (West 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 12-5-502 (Supp.
1994).
38. See, e.g., Liability of Commercial Vendors, supra note 26, at 1015-16 (discussing the
differences between broadly constructed and narrowly constructed dram shop acts).
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host, who wrongfully sells or gives away alcohol. 39 The narrowly
constructed statutes, on the other hand, expressly limit the application of
the statute in various ways, such as limiting its application to commercial
vendors .40
Traditionally, broadly constructed dram shop statutes, although
appearing to apply to commercial vendors and social hosts alike, have
been strictly construed by the courts to apply only to commercial
vendors of alcohol. 4 1 However, the courts of three states have previously
recognized that broadly constructed dram shop acts impose liability on
social hosts.42 The three courts which have recognized that broadly
39. Id.; e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975). Alabama's dram shop statute provides that "[elvery
wife, child, parent, or other person who shall be injured ... by any intoxicated person... shall have a
right of action against any person who shall, by selling, giving, or otherwise disposing of to another,
contrary to the provisions of law, any liquors or beverages, cause the intoxication." Id. "Twelve
states have [dram shop] statutes broad enough to encompass social host liability, though some have no
major reported cases on the subject." James M. Goldberg, Social Host Liability for Serving Alcohol, 28
TRIAL 30, March 1992, at 32 [hereinafter Goldberg]. These states include: "Alabama, Colorado,
Idaho. Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, [and]
Wisconsin." Id. at 33 n.1 1. However, until recently only Alabama had extended its dram shop act to
allow for social host liability. Martin v. Watts, 513 So.2d 958,963 (Ala. 1987).
40. E.g., Wyo. STAT. § 12-5-502 (Supp. 1994). The statute provides:
If any court, parent or guardian gives written notice to any licensee that his or her child
or ward is under the age of twenty-one (21) years, or any spouse or dependent gives
written notice to a licensee that his or her spouse or person liable for the support of the
dependent is an habitual drunkard ... and the licensee or permittee so notified thereafter
sells or gives any alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to the child, ward or habitual
drunkard, the person giving the notice may bring an action ... against the licensee....
Id. (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 199 N.E.2d 300, 306 (I11. App. Ct. 1964)
(holding that the broadly constructed Illinois Dram Shop Act only applies to commercial vendors of
alcohol); Harris v. Hardesty, 207 P. 188, 190 (Kan. 1922) (concluding that the Kansas dram shop act,
with language identical to the then existing North Dakota Act, would not provide for recovery against
a social host because the word "giving" in the statute covers situations when a tavern owner gives a
drink away); Gabrielle v. Craft, 428 N.Y.S.2d 84, 87 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (interpreting the word
"giving" in the broadly constructed New York Dram Shop Act to refer to instances when commercial
vendors of alcohol provide a drink on the house).
42. Williams v. Klemsrud. 197 N.W.2d 614,615 (Iowa 1967); Ross v. Ross, 200 N.W.2d 149, 150
(Minn. 1972); Martin v. Watts, 513 So.2d 958, 958 (Ala. 1987). In Williams, a 21 year old college
student purchased alcohol for a minor who became intoxicated from the alcohol and was involved in a
car accident. Williams, 197 N.W.2d at 615. An injured person from the accident brought suit against
the college student alleging a violation of the state's dram shop act. Id. at 614-15. The Iowa Supreme
Court found that the language of the state's broadly constructed dram shop act clearly applied to social
hosts. Id. at 616.
In Ross, a minor was furnished alcohol by his brother which caused him to become intoxicated.
Ross, 200 N.W.2d at 150. The minor was involved in an automobile accident and died. Id. The
parents of the decedent sued the brother of the decedent based upon the state's dram shop act. Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the history of the state's broadly constructed dram shop act
showed that the act was intended to apply to anyone who wrongfully provided alcohol to another,
including a social host. Id. at 152-53.
In Martin, a minor was provided with alcohol at a party thrown by a social organization.
Martin, 513 So.2d at 958. The Alabama Supreme Court found that a social organization not licensed to
sell alcohol, which in violation of the state's dram shop act and beverage control act, provides alcohol
to minor guests at a party may be liable. Id. at 963.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
constructed dram shop acts include social host liability have justified
their break from the general rule by noting that the dram shop acts in
their respective states were remedial in nature and, therefore, should be
liberally construed. 43 Two of the states whose courts found the dram
shop act to apply to social hosts, however, abrogated the courts' deci-
sions through legislative action.44
B. HISTORY OF DRAM SHOP LIABILITY IN NORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota has historically held commercial providers of alcohol
civilly liable for wrongfully serving alcohol. 45 Prior to statehood, the
territorial law of Dakota provided a limited civil remedy for relatives
when tavern keepers served habitual drunkards with written notice of
their drunkenness.4 6 However, following statehood in 1889, the North
43. Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 199 N.E.2d 300, 305-06 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964). Dram shop
acts can be characterized as either penal or remedial in nature. Id. The characterization of dram
shop acts as either penal or remedial in nature has been the primary reason why courts of different
jurisdictions have come to opposite conclusions on the issue of social host liability under broadly
worded dram shop acts. Compare Miller, 199 N.E.2d at 305-06 (finding that Illinois' broadly
constructed dram shop act was limited in application to commercial vendors in part because of its
penal nature) with Williams v. Klemsrud, 197 N.W.2d 614, 615 (Iowa 1972) (finding the Iowa dram
shop act applicable to social hosts in part because of its remedial nature). The reason for the
difference is that statutes which are penal in nature will be narrowly construed, while remedial
statutes will be broadly construed. Williams, 197 N.W.2d at 615; see also Iszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d
665,667 (N.D. 1957) (holding that North Dakota's dram shop statute is remedial in nature).
44. IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.801 (West
1990). The Iowa legislature effectively overruled the court's recognition of social host liability in
Williams by repealing the then existing dram shop act and passing a new act which limited recovery to
instances where the gift or sale of liquor was from a permittee or licensee. IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92;
see Lewis v. Iowa, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977) (noting that the legislative amendments to the dram
shop act effectively overruled the holding in Williams).
The Minnesota legislature effectively overruled the decision in Ross by removing the word
"giving" from the state's dram shop act thereby limiting its applicability to commercial vendors. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 340A.801; see Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 1982)
(noting that the legislature's amendment of the dram shop act following the Ross decision preempted
any cause of action against social hosts).
Therefore, only the state of Alabama provided liability for social hosts under dram shop acts.
Martin v. Watts, 513 So.2d 958 (Ala. 1987). However, the Martin rule in Alabama appears to be
limited to instances when a minor is served by a social host. Id. at 963; see Beeson v. Scoles Cadillac
Corp., 506 So.2d 999, 1001 (Ala. 1987) (finding that a sale or an illegal provision of alcohol by the
social host must occur thereby denying recovery if the provision of alcohol is to an intoxicated adult
which is not against the law).
45. REV. CODES OF DAKOTA TERRrrORY, ch. 35, § 4 (1877).
46. Id. The 1877 code provided that:
Any ... relative of a person who is in the habit of getting intoxicated . .. may make
complaint to any justice of the peace of the county where such person resides . . .
alleging the name or names of the person or persons from whom said person having such
habit obtains his liquor ... and thereupon said justice of the peace shall, without charge
therefor, issue a notice in writing to such person or persons so named, notifying him or
them that no intoxicating liquors of any kind must be sold or given away by him or them,
or at his or their place of business, to such person having such habit ... and after the
service of such notice if any person or persons so notified shall sell, give away, or permit
any person at his place of business to sell or give away any intoxicating liquors to such
person about whom he or they have received notice . .. (the person notified shall] be
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Dakota legislature passed the Prohibition Act 47 which included a dram
shop provision which gave injured parties an unlimited right of action
against an alcohol provider.48
The North Dakota Dram Shop Act, although subject to many
legislative amendments through the years, has remained relatively the
same in terms of who is subject to liability under the statute.49 In 1987,
the North Dakota legislature enacted a new dram shop act which retained
the language of the prior acts concerning who is subject to liability. 50
liable in a civil action at the suit of such relative to pay him, her, or them the sum offive
hundred dollars damages for each offense....
Id. (emphasis added).
47. 1890 N.D. Laws ch. 110, § 15. The provision was entitled: An Act to Prescribe Penalties for
the Unlawful Manufacture, Sale and Keeping for Sale Intoxicating Liquors, and to Regulate the Sale,
Barter and Giving Away of Such Liquors for Medical, Scientific and Mechanical Purposes. Id.
48. Id. The 1890 code of North Dakota provided that:
Every wife, child, parent, guardian or employer or other person who shall be injured in
person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of
intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, such wife, child, parent or guardian, or
employer shall have a right of action, in his or her own name, against any person who
shall by selling, bartering or giving away intoxicating liquors, have caused the
intoxication of such person, for all damages actually sustained, as well as for exemplary
damages ....
Id.
49. Prior to 1987, the North Dakota Dram Shop Act read:
Every spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is injured by any
intoxicated person, or in consequence of intoxication, has a claim for relief against any
person who caused such intoxication by disposing, selling, bartering, or giving away
alcoholic beverages contrary to statute for all damages sustained, and in the event death
ensues, the survivors of the decedent are entitled to damages defined in section 32-21-
02.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 05-01-06 (1985) (emphasis added).
The "contrary to statute" requirement was satisfied by showing a violation of section 05-01-09
of the North Dakota Century Code. Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151, 152 (N.D. 1989). See
supra note 33 (providing the relevant text of section 05-01-09).
50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 05-01-06.1 (1987). Section 05-01-06.1 of the North Dakota Century
Code states that:
Every spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is injured by any
obviously intoxicated person has a claim for relief for fault under section 32-03.2-02
against any person who knowingly disposes, sells, barters, or gives away alcoholic
beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age, an incompetent, or an obviously
intoxicated person, and if death ensues, the survivors of the decedent are entitled to
damages defined in section 32-21-02. No claim for relief pursuant to this section may be
had on behalf of the intoxicated person nor on behalf of the intoxicated person's estate
or personal representatives; nor may a claim for relief be had on behalf of an adult
passenger in an automobile driven by an intoxicated person or on behalf of the
passenger's estate or personal representatives.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 05-01-06.1 (1987) (emphasis added). Compare 1987 Dram Shop Act with pre-
1987 Dram Shop Act, supra note 49 and 1890 Dram Shop Act, supra note 50. In essence, each of the
dram shop acts holds any person liable who sells or gives away alcohol in its violation. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 05-01-06 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 05-01-06.1 (1987).
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However, the 1987 Dram Shop Act was fundamentally different from the
pre-1987 Act because of its incorporation of North Dakota's Compara-
tive Fault Statute.51
Prior to Born,52 all of the North Dakota case law concerning dram
shop liability arose under the dram shop acts that existed prior to
1987.53 However, the court's recent decisions regarding the 1987 Dram
Shop Act, indicate that many of the interpretations of the pre-1987 Act
are still valid as applied to the 1987 Act.54 The Dram Shop Act is the
exclusive civil remedy available in North Dakota against the provider of
alcohol for a party injured by the acts of an intoxicated person.55
Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court has determined that the
Dram Shop Act is remedial in nature and must therefore be liberally
construed to serve the interests that were sought to be protected by its
passage .56
51. Stewart v. Ryan, 520 N.W.2d 39, 46 (N.D. 1994) ("[tlhe dram shop amendments specifically
incorporate the requirement of [section 32-03.2-02 of the North Dakota Century Code], for allocation
of fault among all persons 'who contributed to the injury"'). N.D. CENr. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp.
1995); see infra note 76 (providing the relevant text of section 32-03.2-02).
52. 514 N.W.2d 687 (N.D. 1994).
53. Born v. Mayers, 514 N.W.2d 687,689-90 (N.D. 1994). Born was the first case in which the
North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted the 1987 Dram Shop Act. Id. The cases prior to Born had
causes of action which arose before July 1, 1987, the effective date of the 1987 Act. See Aanenson v.
Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151, 152 (N.D. 1989) (noting that the dram shop act had been amended in 1987,
but that the date of the injuries giving rise to the dram shop claim occurred on October 26, 1985,
thereby necessitating the use of the pre-1987 Dram Shop Act).
54. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 690 (citing Iszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665. 667 (N.D. 1957). for the
proposition that the 1987 Dram Shop Act is remedial in nature like its predecessors); Stewart, 520
N.W.2d at 46-47 (citing Meshefski v. Shirnan Corp., 385 N.W.2d 474 (N.D. 1986), as authority for the
level of causation required under the 1987 Dram Shop Act).
It is not clear whether all of the court's interpretations of the pre-1987 Dram Shop Act will be
valid when the 1987 Act is applied to similar fact patterns. For instance, in Aanenson v. Bastien, the
court, while applying the pre-1987 Dram Shop Act, refused to recognize a complicity defense for a
tavern owner when the drinking companion of an intoxicated person purchased drinks for the
intoxicated person. Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151, 156-57 (N.D. 1989). The court stated that
"[als between the liquor merchant and a drinking companion, we believe the legislature intended the
responsibility and liability for serving alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person to fall on the
merchant." Id. at 157. With the incorporation of comparative fault principles into the dram shop
action, a drinking companion who continues to buy drinks for an intoxicated person might now be held
partially liable. N.D. CENT. CODE § 05-01-06.1 (1987); see also Stewart. 520 N.W.2d at 46 (noting that
the court's previous rejection of contributory negligence as a defense under earlier dram shop acts is
no longer applicable).
55. See Thoring v. Bottonsek, 350 N.W.2d 586, 588 (N.D. 1984) (noting that the North Dakota
Dram Shop Act supersedes any claim against tavern owners which may have arisen under common
law).
56. Iszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665, 667 (N.D. 1957). Dram shop acts are in derogation of the
traditional common law rule of immunity for the alcohol provider. See supra notes 24-25 and
accompanying text. Therefore, under common law principles of statutory interpretation, dram shop
acts should be strictly construed. N.D. CENT. CODE § 01-02-01 (1987). However, under section 1-02-
01 of the North Dakota Century Code, the traditional rule of strictly construing statutes in derogation of
the common law does not apply. Id.
The purpose of the North Dakota Dram Shop Act has never been clearly defined by the court.
The court has noted that the purpose of the Act is to discourage bars from selling alcohol to visibly
intoxicated persons or minors and provide a method of recovery for those persons injured as a result
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Although dram shop acts generally impose strict liability, the North
Dakota Supreme Court recognized that the North Dakota Dram Shop
Act does not impose strict liability on alcohol providers. 57 However, the
pre-1987 Dram Shop Act imposed liability when it could be shown,
regardless of a showing of negligence or willful conduct on the part of
the alcohol provider, 58 that: 1) there was a knowing sale or gift of
alcohol to a minor, habitual drunkard, or intoxicated person, 59 2) the
of the wrongful sales of alcohol. Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151, 161 (N.D. 1989) (citing
Browder v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 321 N.W.2d 668 (Mich. 1982)). However, the court in
Iszler noted that the more general remedy sought to be advanced by dram shop acts is to give a "cause
of action to every person who is injured in person, property or means of support as the result of the
intoxication of any person when the intoxication was caused by the use of alcoholic beverages sold or
given away" in violation of the act. Iszler, 80 N.W.2d at 667-68. See also Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 47.
57. KEETON, ET AL., supra note 36, § 81. See Feuerherm v. Ertelt. 286 N.W.2d 509, 511 (N.D.
1979) (citing Iszler, 80 N.W.2d at 667) (stating that the dram shop statute is a distinct cause of action
unrelated to existing tort theories).
58. Iszler, 80 N.W.2d at 669 (referring to the trial courts jury instruction outlining the elements of
a cause of action under the North Dakota Dram Shop Act as a "fair statement of the law applicable to
the case"); Ross By Kanta v. Scott, 386 N.W.2d 18, 22-23 (N.D. 1986); Jore v. Saturday Night Club,
Inc., 227 N.W.2d 889, 896 (N.D. 1975).
59. Jore, 227 N.W.2d at 895; Meshefski v. Shiman Corp., 385 N.W.2d 474,476-77 (N.D. 1986).
In order to determine whether an alcohol provider knowingly provided alcohol to an intoxicated
person as defined under the statute, the Jore court considered a Minnesota interpretation persuasive.
Jore, 227 N.W.2d at 895 (citing Strand v. Village of Watson, 72 N.W.2d 609,615 (Minn. 1955)). That
interpretation states that:
[T]he person to whom the sale is made must be intoxicated to such an extent that the
seller, using his usual and reasonable powers of observation, sees or should see that the
buyer is intoxicated. In other words, there must be such outward manifestation of
intoxication that a person using his reasonable powers of observation can see or should
see that such person has become intoxicated.
Id. (quoting Strand, 72 N.W.2d at 615 ).
The court in Jore found that a person is not "intoxicated" under the dram shop act in the same
sense that they may be "under the influence of alcoholic beverages" within the traffic statutes. Id.
The court later approved the following jury instruction, which contained a more detailed definition of
intoxication under the Dram Shop Act:
A person is intoxicated ... when his manner is unusual or abnormal and his intoxicated
condition is reflected in his walk or conversation, when his ordinary judgment and
common senses are disturbed, when his usual will power is temporarily suspended, and
these or similar symptoms .. . become reasonably discernable to a person of ordinary
experience. It is not necessary that the person should be so-called 'dead drunk' or
helplessly intoxicated. It is enough that his senses are substantially impaired by the use of
intoxicating beverages.
Meshefski, 385 N.W.2d at 477 (quoting the trial court's instructions). The court in Meshefski also
determined that the intoxication of the person being served may result from alcohol or any other
intoxicant. Id. The language of section 05-01-06.1 requires that a "knowing" sale be made to an
intoxicated person which has been defined as "acting voluntarily and not because of mistake or
inadvertence." Stewart v. Ryan, 520 N.W.2d 39.49 (N.D. 1994). N.D. CENT. CODE § 05-01-06.1
(1987).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
consumption of the alcohol caused or contributed to a state of intoxica-
tion,60 and 3) the intoxication was a cause of the injuries sustained. 61
It was within this framework that the North Dakota Supreme Court
faced the issue of whether to hold social hosts liable under the 1987
Dram Shop Act.
III. ANALYSIS
In Born v. Mayers,62 the North Dakota Supreme Court had its first
opportunity to decide whether the North Dakota Dram Shop Act 63
applies to social hosts in the same manner as it applies to commercial
vendors of alcohol. 64 The court concluded that the 1987 Dram Shop
Act applies to any person, including a social host, who supplies alcohol
to an obviously intoxicated person.65
In concluding that the 1987 Dram Shop Act applies to social hosts,
the court relied solely on the plain language of the statute without
reference to the legislative history. 66 The court reasoned that the langu-
age of the 1987 Dram Shop Act was unambiguous, thereby eliminating
60. Ross By Kanta v. Scott, 386 N.W.2d 18, 23 (N.D. 1986). In Ross By Kanta, the court noted
that a plaintiff in a dram shop action must show "that the consumption of the alcoholic beverages
contributed to a state of intoxication." Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Dram Shop Act "does
not require that a claimant thereunder prove that an intoxicated person received his last drink at the
defendant's place of business." Wanna v. Miller, 136 N.W.2d 563, 570 (N.D. 1965). If the dram
shop violation is due to a provision of alcohol to a minor, the plaintiff does not need to show that the
minor was intoxicated at the time of the sale or provision. Ross By Kanta, 386 N.W.2d at 22.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has found that a plaintiff failed to establish that the alcohol
contributed to the intoxication of the individual only once. Fladeland v. Mayer, 102 N.W.2d 121, 125
(N.D. 1960). In Fladeland, the court noted that:
(Tihe illegal sale must have been made to the person whose intoxication caused the
damage complained of. Or such a sale must have been made to a person under such
circumstances that the seller knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the person
to whom such sale was made would give or share such alcoholic beverage with the
person whose intoxication caused the damages suffered.
Id. at 123 (citing Bell v. Poindexter, 84 NE.2d 646 (111. App. Ct. 1949)).
61. Meshefski v. Shirnan Corp., 385 N.W.2d 474,476-77 (N.D. 1986). Section 05-01-06 of the
North Dakota Century Code (pre-1987 Dram Shop Act) provided grounds for recovery both for: (1)
injuries sustained by third parties due to the acts of an intoxicated person: or (2) injuries to the
intoxicated person as a result of the intoxication. Id. at 476. In Meshefski, the court ruled that when
the cause of action arises from the affirmative acts of an intoxicated person against a third party,
proximate causation is not required between the intoxication and the injuries sustained by the third
party. Id. The 1987 Dram Shop Act only allows a cause of action for injuries sustained by a third
party as a result of the intoxication of another. N.D. CENT. CODE § 05-01-06.1 (1987). Therefore,
under the Meshefski rule, proximate causation is not required between the intoxication of an individual
and the injury sustained by a third party. Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 47. However, the injuries must have
been inflicted by the intoxicated person. Id.
62. 514 N.W.2d 687 (N.D. 1994).
63. N.D. CENT. CODE § 05-01-06.1 (1987). See supra note 50 (providing the text of section 05-
01-06.1).
64. Born v. Mayers. 514 N.W.2d 687,688 (N.D. 1994).
65. Id. at 690.
66. Id. at 689.
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the necessity of looking to the legislative history.67 The court also noted
that the dram shop act is to be liberally construed to fully effectuate the
purpose of the statute.68 Accordingly, the court ruled that the unambigu-
ous language of the 1987 Dram Shop Act, when liberally construed,
clearly indicates that the legislative intent was for the statute to apply to
"any person" who "gives" or "otherwise disposes" of alcohol to an
obviously intoxicated person. 69 The court concluded that to otherwise
construe the 1987 Dram Shop Act in a way which would limit its appli-
cability to commercial vendors would only detract from the purpose of
the Act.70
In support of its ruling, the court cited three cases from other
jurisdictions, in which courts similarly found that social hosts could be
liable under dram shop acts which were substantively similar to North
Dakota's. 71
67. Id. "When statutory language is free from ambiguity, it is neither necessary nor appropriate
to delve into legislative history to determine legislative intent." Id. (citing State v. Bower, 442 N.W.2d
438 (N.D. 1989)). This is so, "because the legislative intent is presumed clear from the face of the
statute." Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 01-02-05 (1987); District One Republican Comm. v. District
One Democrat Comm., 466 N.W.2d 820 (N.D. 1991)). Furthermore, when interpreting the language
of unambiguous statutes, the "(wiords used ... are to be understood in their ordinary sense." Id.
(citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 01-02-02 (1987)).
68. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 689. "Section 5-01-06.1 ... like its predecessor (Section 5-01-02.1,
N.D.R.C. 1943), is remedial in character and should be liberally construed to advance its remedy." Id.
(citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 01-02-01 (1987); Iszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665 (N.D. 1957)). To review
the purpose of section 05-01-06.1, see supra note 56.
69. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 689. The court noted that "[t]he language could not be more clear that
the claim for relief is against anyone, without limitation, who knowingly commits the prohibited
conduct." Id.
70. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 690. The court concluded that "[t]o construe [s]ection 5-01-06.1 [to
only apply to commercial vendors] would neither 'suppress the mischief' sought to be suppressed by
the Dram Shop Act, nor 'advance the remedy' provided." Id. (citing Meshefski v. Shirnan Corp., 385
N.W.2d 474,478 (N.D. 1986). See supra note 56 (discussing the purpose of section 05-01-06.1). The
Born court's recognition of social host liability under the 1987 Dram Shop Act, is consistent with the
lszler rationale that civil recovery to persons injured as a result of wrongful provisions of alcohol is the
purpose of the Act. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 690; Iszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665, 667-68 (N.D. 1957).
71. Williams v. Klemsrud, 197 N.W.2d 614,616 (Iowa 1967); Ross v. Ross, 200 N.W.2d 149, 153
(Minn. 1972); Martin v. Watts, 513 So.2d 958, 963 (Ala. 1987). See supra notes 42-44 and
accompanying text (summarizing each of the cases).
In order to show that the language of the 1987 Dram Shop Act clearly provided for social host
liability, the Born court quoted from Martin, interpreting the Alabama Dram Shop Act as follows:
We note that the legislature, in describing the conduct which will trigger the application
of § 6-5-71, has employed words and phrases which have or suggest a general
application: 'any person who shall, by selling, giving or otherwise disposing of to another.
contrary to the provisions of law.' Had the legislature intended to limit the class of
persons against whom an action could be brought, the draftsmen could certainly have
employed words much better suited to an expression of such an intent. If it was the
intention to create a right of action against only that narrowly defined class of persons,
i.e., 'commercial dispensers.' . . . the draftsmen could have ... stopped with the words
'by selling.' They did not do that. Instead, they included the terms 'giving' and
'otherwise disposing of.' It is hard to imagine a phrase more expansive than 'otherwise
disposing of.'
Born, 514 N.W.2d at 689-90 (quoting Martin v. Watts, 513 So.2d at 961). See also supra note 39
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The court rejected the appellees' argument that the extension of
dram shop liability to social hosts via the 1987 Dram Shop Act leads to
an "absurd or ludicrous result."72 In support of its decision, the court
incorporated language from a Minnesota Supreme Court decision in
which the court found it reasonable to expect a social host to make some
effort to control the drinking at a party. 73
The court further justified its holding in Born on the grounds that
the language of the 1987 Dram Shop Act limits the amount of liability
to which a social host is exposed.74 Although the court did not explain
the limitations on liability provided by the 1987 Dram Shop Act, it stated
that the Act limits the liability through the use of phrases such as "know-
ingly provides" and "obviously intoxicated person." 75  The court
further noted that the incorporation of the North Dakota Comparative
Fault Statute76 into the 1987 Dram Shop Act allows "the factfinder to
compare the conduct or 'fault' of all persons involved in a particular
incident from which the claim arises." 77 The court concluded that these
(providing the relevant text of ALA. CODE § 6-5-71).
72. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 690 (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dickinson Econo-Storage, 474
N.W.2d 50 (N.D. 1991), which noted that it is presumed that the legislature did not intend a ludicrous
or absurd result when passing statutes).
73. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 690. The court in Born quoted from Ross v. Ross, 200 N.W.2d 149
(Minn. 1972) as follows:
Where liquor is furnished in a purely social setting, ordinarily it may be expected that the
donor will take some precautions to determine the age of the recipient or his state of
intoxication. While the act applies to those who furnish liquor to those invited to wedding
receptions and company picnics as well as to other gatherings where supervision may be
onerous, no reason occurs to us why those who furnish liquor to others, even on social
occasions, should not be responsible for protecting innocent third persons from the
potential dangers of indiscriminately furnishing such hospitality.
Born, 514 N.W.2d at 690 (quoting Ross, 200 N.W.2d at 153).
74. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 690 (two cities in previous note).
75. Id. The term "obviously" was added to the Dram Shop Act in 1987. N.D. CENT. CODE § 05-
01-06.1 (1987). See supra notes 49 & 50 (containing the relevant portions of the pre-1987 Act and the
1987 Act).
76. N. D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1995). The North Dakota Comparative Fault Statute,
section 32-03.2-02, provides in relevant part:
Contributory fault does not bar recovery in an action by any person to recover damages
for death or injury to person or property unless the fault was as great as the combined
fault of all other persons who contribute to the injury, but any damages allowed must be
diminished in proportion to the amount of contributing fault attributable to the person
recovering... When two or more parties are found to have contributed to the injury, the
liability of each party is several only; and is not joint, and each party is liable only for the
amount of damages attributable to the percentage of fault of that party, except that any
persons who act in concert in committing a tortious act or aid or encourage the act, or
ratifies or adopts the act for their benefit, are jointly liable for all damages attributable to
their combined percentage of fault. Under this section, fault includes negligence. ..
dram shop liability .... [and] reckless or willful conduct ....
Id.
77. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 690 (discussing section 32-03.2-02 of the North Dakota Century Code);
See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of the incorporation of the
comparative fault scheme into the North Dakota Dram Shop Act).
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built-in limitations act as safeguards against the indiscriminate imposi-
tion of liability against innocent hosts.78
IV. IMPACT
The potential impact of the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision
in Born79 cannot be fully realized without reference to the court's
subsequent decision in Stewart v. Ryan.80
In Stewart, the North Dakota Supreme Court had the opportunity to
further define the elements of the 1987 Dram Shop Act. 81 The court in
Stewart attempted to clearly establish the level of causation required
under the 1987 Dram Shop Act between the provision of alcohol and the
injury sustained by a third party.82 Previously, the expressed reference
to the North Dakota Comparative Fault Statute 83 within the 1987 Dram
Shop Act caused confusion over the level of causation required by the
1987 Act.84
The court in Stewart concluded that the expressed reference to the
Comparative Fault Statute in the 1987 Dram Shop Act is relevant only to
the allocation of fault after a dram shop violation is found.85 Therefore,
78. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 690.
79. 514 N.W.2d 687 (N.D. 1994).
80. 520 N.W.2d 39 (N.D. 1994); Born v. Mayers, 514 N.W.2d 687 (N.D. 1994).
81. Stewart v. Ryan, 520 N.W.2d 39 (N.D. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 05-01-06.1 (1987); see also
supra note 50 (providing the text of section 05-01-06.1). In Stewart, the police chief of Emerado, Eric
Stewart. and his family brought suit against three different bar owners for injuries Stewart sustained
while attempting to subdue Dale Densmore, a patron of the three bars. Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 42.
While trying to break up an altercation, Stewart was shot twice by Densmore. Id. Densmore
subsequently pleaded guilty to attempted murder. Id.
The Stewarts brought an action against the bar-owners under the 1987 Dram Shop Act. Id.
The defendants denied the plaintiffs' allegations, asserting that Densmore's criminal act of shooting
Stewart was an intervening, superseding cause of the injuries. Id. The district court found that as a
matter of law the criminal act of Densmore was an intervening, superseding cause of the injuries
sustained by Stewart and granted summary judgment to the bar owners. Id. Stewart appealed and the
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling and remanded, instructing the district
court to compare the fault of the parties once a dram shop violation is found. Id. at 42, 50.
82. Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 44-45 (noting that "the issue in this case involves the effect of the
1987 legislation on a dram shop cause of action").
83. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (1987); see supra note 76 (providing the text of section 32-
03.2-02).
84. Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 44-45. The source of the dispute over the effect of the expressed
reference to section 32-03.2-02 in the 1987 Dram Shop Act is in large part attributable to section 32-
03.2-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, which states that the "[liegal requirements of causal
relation apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contributory fault." N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
03.2-01 (1987). The bar owners in Stewart claimed that the intent of the legislature, manifested by its
cite to section 32-03.2-02 within the 1987 Dram Shop Act, was to create a negligence based dram
shop action to take the place of the traditional statutory liability of the pre-1987 Dram Shop Act.
Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 42.
85. Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 47. The court noted that "[t]he dram shop amendments specifically
incorporate the requirement of... [section] 32-03.2-02, for allocation of fault among all persons 'who
contributed to the injury."' Id. at 46; N.D. CENT. CODE § 05-01-06.1 (1987); see also supra note 50
(providing the text of section 05-01-06.1). The court further noted that section 32-03.2-02 specifically
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the level of causation required between the wrongful provision of
alcohol and the injury sustained by a third person under the 1987 Dram
Shop Act is the same as was required under the pre-1987 Act.86
The North Dakota Supreme Court's recognition of social host
liability in Born,87 in light of its subsequent retention of traditional dram
shop liability under the 1987 Dram Shop Act in Stewart,88 is both
unique and significant. 89 The decisions are unique because North
Dakota is currently one of only two states which hold social hosts liable
under dram shop acts.90 Furthermore, North Dakota appears to be the
only state that currently extends liability under dram shop acts to social
provides that "dram shop liability" is included within the concept of "fault" along with "negligence"
and "reckless or willful conduct." Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 46; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (1987);
see also supra note 76 (providing the text of section 32-03.2-02). The court concluded, however, that
the legislature, by separately outlining in section 32-03.2-02 the different theories of liability that are
included within the concept of fault, intended to keep the theories distinct for proving liability, but to
treat them the same for comparative fault purposes. Stewart. 520 N.W.2d at 46. The definition of
fault "indicates that negligence remains a separate theory from dram shop liability, and contemplates
that negligence, willful conduct, and dram shop liability are all integrated for the allocation of fault
among those 'who contributed to the injury."' Id. Therefore, the court held that "[section] 5-01-06.1 .
. . speciffies] the conduct necessary to establish a dram shop violation, i.e., 'fault,' and the '[liegal
requirements of causal relation' in . . . [sections] 32-03.2-01 and 32-03.2-02 to retain those causal
requirements for purposes of allocating fault among those 'who contributed to the injury."' Id. at 47.
86. Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 47. The court summarized its position as follows:
The 1987 dram shop amendments retained the ground for recovery for persons "injured
by an obviously intoxicated person." In the absence of a contrary definition by the
Legislature and to advance the remedial purpose of the dram shop law to protect the
public from dram shop violations, we construe the "[li]egal requirements of causal
relation" for dram shop actions to retain the causation requirements from Meshefski, i.e.,
the dram shop violation must have contributed to the obviously intoxicated person's
intoxication and the plaintiffs injury must have been inflicted by the intoxicated person.
Id. (citations omitted); see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing the elements under
the pre-1987 Dram Shop Act).
Justice Levine wrote a separate opinion concurring in result only. Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 50-
51 (Levine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Levine supported the position taken
by the bar owners in her separate opinion by arguing that the incorporation of the comparative fault
statute showed that the legislature was intending to hold dram shop violators liable only if they
proximately caused the injuries sustained by a third person. Id. Justice Levine stated that, "[iln
overhauling the dram shop statute, the legislature intended to remove strict liability from dram shop
actions and apply negligence principles." Id. at 50. Justice Levine therefore concluded that section
32-03.2-01 includes dram shop liability within the concept of "fault," which is governed by the
traditional rules of legal causation in accordance with section 32-03.2-01. Id. at 50-51.
87. 514 N.W.2d 687.
88. 520 N.W.2d 39.
89. Born v. Mayers, 514 N.W.2d 687 (N.D. 1994); Stewart v. Ryan, 520 N.W.2d 39 (N.D. 1994).
90. The other state is Alabama. Martin v. Watts, 513 So.2d 958 (Ala. 1987). See supra notes 40-
42 and accompanying text (discussing the Alabama standard).
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hosts who wrongfully serve adults.91 Much of the significance of the
court's decision in Born arises from the court placing a statutory burden
on social hosts that is the same as the burden facing commercial vendors
of alcohol. 92 Placing social hosts and commercial vendors on equal
ground raises significant public policy questions. 93
Currently, there are many unanswered questions concerning the
application of North Dakota's dram shop law to social hosts. The Born
case came to the supreme court on certified question from federal
district court.94 Because an answer to a certified question is not based on
the facts of a case, the uncertainty surrounding social host liability in
North Dakota is compounded by the lack of a factual decision. 95 Such a
91. Alabama does not recognize social host liability unless the service of alcohol was illegal,
thereby eliminating social host liability for hosts who serve non-minor guests. See supra notes 40-42
and accompanying text (discussing the Alabama standard).
The vast majority of jurisdictions that recognize social host liability, under any theory, generally
do so only when minors are served alcohol. Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Social Host's
Liability For Injuries Incurred By Third Parties As A Result Of Intoxicated Guest's Negligence, 62
A.L.R.4th 16, 47-65 (1988). See supra notes 32-33 (noting that social host liability under beverage
control acts and common law negligence principles are generally limited to instances when minors are
served).
92. To review the burden facing both commercial vendors and social hosts under the 1987 Dram
Shop Act, see supra notes 58-61, 84-86 and accompanying text.
93. There are persuasive public policy arguments on both sides of the social host liability issue.
Arguments against the imposition of social host liability generally stress the differences between social
hosts and commercial vendors of alcohol. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1233-35 (NJ. 1984)
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (discussing the public policy reasons why courts should not recognize social
host liability). One of the key differences between commercial vendors of alcohol and social hosts is
that commercial vendors have the ability to pass dram shop risk on to customers in the form of higher
prices. Id. at 1234. Social hosts will have to abstain from having parties or hedge the risk they face by
paying increased premiums for insurance. See Social Host Liability, supra note 26, at 1119-25
(discussing the effect of social host liability on insurance rates). A second difference is that the social
host usually has much less experience dealing with intoxicated guests and may find it difficult to
decide when a person is or is not 'obviously intoxicated.' Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting). The North Dakota Supreme court has noted that "[piresumably, the dram shop merchant
is refraining from imbibing alcohol while engaging in the business of selling and dispensing alcoholic
beverages and thus is in a much better position to know when the imbibers have become intoxicated
than the imbibers themselves." Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151, 161 (N.D. 1989). A final
difference between commercial vendors and social hosts is the lack of control over the alcohol in most
social host settings, compounded by the pressure in a social environment not to agitate friends or
business acquaintances. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1234. A commercial vendor naturally faces less pressure
in this regard and may be affected to a lesser degree by hard feelings on the part of the patron. Id.
On the other hand there are significant arguments for the imposition of social host liability.
Born, 514 N.W.2d 687. The purpose of the North Dakota Dram Shop Act is remedial, and it is
intended to protect innocent third parties who are injured by the actions of an intoxicated individual.
Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 46. Between the innocent third parties and the provider of alcohol, it is the
provider of alcohol that is in the best position to avoid the loss. Burkhart v. Harrod. 755 P.2d 759, 766
(Wash. 1988) (Utter, J., concurring). Furthermore, the North Dakota Dram Shop Act has built in
limitations on the amount of liability that a social host is subject to through the use of comparative fault
principles and requiring a 'knowing' provision of alcohol to an 'obviously intoxicated' person. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 05-01-06.1 (1987).
94. Born v. Mayers, 514 N.W.2d 687, 688 (N.D. 1994).
95. See supra note 18 (noting the settlement between the parties in this case).
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decision would help define the parameters of liability currently facing
social hosts under the 1987 Dram Shop Act.
In conclusion, the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Born
appears to be sound, based on the language of the 1987 Dram Shop
Act. 96 However, the question of whether the language of the 1987 Dram
Shop Act provides for social host liability was not the most important
question facing the court. The most important question facing the court
was whether social host liability should be recognized in North
Dakota-a public policy question that may be best left to the legislature.
Daniel R. Conrad
96. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 690.
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